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Papiya Ghosh

The Changing Discourse of the Muhajirs

I

Pakistan, the denominational homeland of the 1940s, ceased to be a migrant option for the Indian Muslim by the late sixties, and more definitively after 1971. With the making of Bangladesh, Muhajirs¹ from the Muslim-minority provinces of undivided India found themselves mapped out of the eastern part of Pakistan to which they had migrated. Their migrant histories straddle both segments of the pre-1971 Pakistan. A documentation of their lives, discourse and politics provides insights to the process of nation-making in the subcontinent.

After 1971, it was no longer just the irony of a Lalvani, saturated with thoughts of Karachi being posted in Gaya as assistant station master and a Kamal bhai who pined for the breeze of Gaya, finding himself destined to stay in Karachi for the rest of his life.² It was about coping with what has been described as “the political accountancy of the Raj”,³ one that was based on the colonial project of religious enumeration,⁴ that is, the terminology of majority and minority.

It is Ayesha Jalal’s argument that ‘the provincial dynamic’ has been underplayed in politics. It is evident from the conflict of interests between Muslims in the majority and the minority provinces that the interests of Indian Muslims did not pour into all-India communal moulds.⁵ Provincialism and ethnic issues have been integral to the politics of Pakistan too, from the beginning.⁶ As a correlate, the boundaries of Muhajir identity have shifted constantly, as also their allies and adversaries. Their relative position too has fluctuated.⁷

By December 1951, around 6,597,000 refugees moved from India to West Pakistan and about 794,127 to the former East Pakistan. During 1947-48, 95.9 per cent of the migrants from Assam, West Bengal and Bihar moved to East Pakistan and 3.2 per cent to Karachi. According to the 1951 census, 66.69 per cent of the migrants in East Pakistan came from West Bengal, 14.50 per cent from Bihar, 11.84 per cent from Assam and 6.97 per cent from other places in India.⁸ Around sixty percent of the 464,000 Muhajirs from U.P. settled in Sindh.⁹ In the aftermath of the riots in Ranchi and Jamshedpur, Biharis continued to migrate to East Pakistan well into the late sixties and added up to around a million.¹⁰ Till the late 1940s, the use of the term Muhajir was meant to enlist the support of refugees from India already living in what became Pakistan. Subsequently, with the hardening of ethnic boundaries a 'revised category' of the term came into use, one that incorporated the Urdu-speaking muhajirs, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups, similarly uprooted at Independence.

Within a few years of the Partition, the Urdu-speaking migrants got distanced from the Pakistani state which came to be associated with the province of Punjab. Migrants from East Punjab gradually came to be labelled Punjabi rather than Muhajir.¹¹

Muhajirs from Bihar recall that it was the dimensions of the 1946 riot in Bihar that clinched the Muslim League's movement for Pakistan. They unfailingly quote Jinnah on this: "I never dreamt that in my lifetime I shall see Pakistan in being, but the tragedy of Bihar has brought it about." Jinnah got the Muslim League to organise a special train to ferry these pre-Partition Bihari refugees to Karachi for rehabilitation by the government of Sindh, to establish the two-nation theory. Also a thousand copies of "The Bihar Tragedy" by Abdul Aziz, were sent for distribution in the British parliament.¹² The Muslim League listed 30,000 deaths. The exodus of refugees after these riots to the camps in Bengal and Sindh, paralleled the 1947 flows of migrants to what became East and West Pakistan.

II

Ayesha, the daughter of a Patna motor mechanic, merely followed her husband the taxi-driver Abdul Waheed from Patna to Dacca in 1947. Even after twenty-four years, her Bengali neighbours in Taanti Bazaar called her Ayesha Bihari. In 1971

when Bangladesh was created Ayesha saved herself by her ability to speak Bengali in Taanti Bazaar, and Urdu in Mohammadpur. In this story by Ibrahim Jalees *A Grave Turned Inside-Out*¹³ we find Ayesha moving to Karachi, post-Bangladesh. On arrival, she was confronted by a slogan written on a wall: "Biharis ...go back."

The routes taken during the second migration from Bangladesh to Pakistan, as described in Intizar Husain's *Basti*,¹⁴ were through India, Nepal, Rangoon and Bangkok. Khvajah Sahib searched all over Karachi for his son on hearing that he had been seen at the Burmese border. And Afzal's grandmother kept repeating, "My child, the flood must have gone down, let's go home." When Afzal told her, "The flood has gone down over there, but it's risen on this side," she said 'all right', and died.

For one family, it was evident as early as 1954 that the migration to East Pakistan was a 'big mistake'.

Partition itself, the cause of the migration was a bigger mistake. Partition could not have taken place without the 1945-46 vote of the minority Muslim provinces in which they were duped by self seekers, opportunists and crooks.¹⁵

However, the family left the East for the West between 1956 and 1958 and, later, for Canada and France. There were several others who moved to UK, the US or the Gulf. As I have discussed elsewhere, this scattered diasporic formation, is still in the making, and is a terrain where the Partition persists in myriad ways.¹⁶ At another subaltern level, a continuous, relatively non-religious transborder migration from Bangladesh into India, and at times on to Pakistan, and vice versa constantly undermines the South Asian state system spawned by the Partition.¹⁷

The Partition's migrants were drawn from different social and cultural backgrounds, and their experiences and reactions to Pakistan and to Partition were not the same.¹⁸ It has been usefully summed up that

We must know that Partition raised in a spectacular and destructive form, many important questions about citizenship, national identity and the making of national and sub-national mentalities: it still demands from us a continuing search for answers.¹⁹

III

Migrants to the east included a mix of civil servants, professionals, small traders, artisans, jute mill workers and railway optees. Most Biharis believed that, as Urdu-speakers they were not only better Pakistanis than their Bengali neighbours but were also racially superior. On several occasions in the 1950s and the 1960s, Bihari mill workers at Narayanganj, Dhaka, Khulna and Chittagong took part in anti-Bengali riots organised by their West Pakistani patrons. By the late 1960s, when the autonomy movement picked up in East Pakistan, some Biharis openly took sides with the Pakistan regime. As a result, attacks on their shops and properties by Bengalis became common in Dhaka and Chittagong by December 1970. Thousands of Biharis were killed at Chittagong, Jessore, Khulna, Rangpur, Saidpur and Mymensingh in early March 1971. Only a handful of Biharis joined the auxiliary forces like the Razakars and the Al Shams raised by the Pakistani authorities, but hundreds of Biharis were killed on charges of collaboration by the Bengali freedom fighters.²⁰

Bangladesh granted citizenship to more than 600,000 non-Bengali Muhajirs.²¹ Of the 534,792 Biharis who applied for repatriation only 118,866 were accepted by the Pakistani government. According to the Shimla and Delhi agreements of 1973 and 1974, the following categories were granted Pakistani citizenship: those born in West Pakistan, former military personnel, central government employees, divided families and hardship cases.²²

As Biharis numbered the largest among the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in East Pakistan they all came to be called Biharis, without the suffix Muhajirs. Since the 1970s they pointedly describe themselves as 'Stranded/Mehsoor/Aatke Pora Pakistanis'. Nasim Khan who worked as a railway guard on the Pakistan Eastern Railways before 1971 heads the 'Stranded Pakistani General Repatriation Committee.' Formed in 1977, the Committee links the quarter of a million people awaiting repatriation in 66 camps across Bangladesh. The Bihari Muslim diaspora in UK and the USA has long been in touch with it, working through the Asian Committee of the British Refugee Council and the Makka based Rabitat al Alam al Islam to get them out of the camps and to Pakistan.

Over the years the miserable huts in the camps in Bangladesh measuring four by six feet or six by ten feet have flown the Pakistani

flag and observed Pakistani political holidays. Sample the cover of a joint weekly bulletin of the 'Stranded Pakistani General Repatriation Committee' and the 'Stranded Pakistan Eastern Railway Employees League' in April 1983, "O Pakistan, With All Thy Faults and Failures We Love Thee". The 'Stranded Pakistanis' have simultaneously described themselves as Muslim Refugees to enlist funding for repatriation to Pakistan and to fob off distress conversion, and addressed the United Nations as well. As Nasim Khan puts it, the UN ought to grant them refugee status and understand that in their case while they did not flee the country, their country fled them.

At one point of time the 'Stranded Pakistanis' contemplated hiring boats to do a Vietnamese boat saga to underline their statelessness. In early 1993, around 325 of them were moved to Punjab but the Rabitat aided repatriation project is now on the back burner, basically because of Sindhi resistance movements. But more on that later. In 1996 some 'Biharis' have despaired and formed a 'Committee for Rehabilitation of Non-Bengalis in Bangladesh' to acquire Bangladeshi citizenship.

In Bangladesh the discourse emerging from the camp-sites provides insights into three decades of retellings of lives scripted by the two-nation theory. What comes across is a documentation of the perspective of Muslims from provinces where they were the *aqliat* (minority) in undivided India. Accounts squarely blame the Muslim League for the uprooting of Biharis from their ancestral homeland, and their having been sacrificed three times over for the process of nation-building of Pakistan: in 1946, 1947 and 1971. The bulk of the railway employees had opted for East Pakistan in 1947, only in response to Jinnah's call to fill the vacuum created by the migration of their Hindu counterparts to India. Yet they were 'betrayed' in 1962 when their 'central' service status was changed to that of 'provincial' service and, as it turned out, it was on this ground that they were excluded from the categories cleared for repatriation to Pakistan, post-1971.

IV

Meanwhile, the initial dominance of the Muhajirs in Pakistan in the cities of Sindh and in national politics has been gradually diminishing. Throughout the fifties, sixties and seventies there was a constant influx of Pathans and Punjabis into

Sindh. Consequently less than half the population are Sindhi speakers, while 22 percent are Muhajirs who account for well over 50 per cent of the urban population of the province. During the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP) era many Sindhis got employment in the provincial civil service.

As a result, the Muhajirs progressively perceived themselves as being marginalised by governments favouring Sindhi and Punjabi interests. Many young Muhajirs broke away from the Jamat-e-Islami and joined a party that made a meteoric entry into Pakistan's political spectrum. This was the Muhajir Qaumi Movement [MQM] which was launched by Altaf Hussain in 1984.

During the eighties, a parallel arms and drugs economy emerged, and came to be seen as the cause of conflict among various linguistic groups in Sindh. The intelligence wing of the army too is believed to have extended monetary support to competing groups. During the 1980s there were riots between Muhajirs and Pathans, Muhajirs and Punjabis and Muhajirs and Sindhis. Dacoities, kidnappings, murders and armed encounters with the security forces became routine happenings. The June 1992 decision of the army to target MQM strongholds in Karachi evoked a lot of allegations.²³

The strategy of the MQM has been to position the Muhajirs as the fifth nationality of Pakistan.²⁴ Representing the lower middle class migrants there are currently three factions: the Altaf Hussain, Haqiqi and the Basic Association for the Citizens of Karachi.²⁵ The discursive switch of the Muhajirs from being 'anti-ethnic to pro-ethnic' has been attributed to the second generation in the MQM (Altaf) working with a 'reduced notion of Pakistan' which is to be crafted out of urban Sindh.²⁶

The MQM has been described as a movement which is diasporic since it has a leadership in exile, in London,²⁷ ever since the army operations began in 1992. It is the third largest party in Pakistan and the second largest in Sindh. In 1996 the Overseas MQM had nineteen branches in the US, and two in Canada.²⁸ The focus of the overseas MQM has been on making a human rights case of happenings in Sindh, along the lines of the 'genocide' of a 22 million strong Muhajir nation. Several human rights organisations, however, have carried reports on its own fascist practices.

According to Altaf Hussain, the struggle from exile has been expensive but is adequately funded by his supporters all over the world. Also, the telephone and information technology has been used

by him for Muhajir politics. His telephone canvassing, sometimes lasting several hours reaches out to Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur. The eighteen MQM demands include a widening of the Muhajir share in federal and provincial services from 7.6 per cent to 12.4 per cent and 40 per cent to 50 per cent respectively, in keeping with their comprising 50 per cent of the population. It has also been campaigning for the repatriation of the 'Stranded Pakistanis' from Bangladesh.

The MQM stipulates the 1996 re-stating of its concepts of the terms Muhajir and Muhajir 'nation' as a response to the argument of the PPP, that not having any land of their own, Muhajirs cannot be defined as a nationality. Its position is that the 'refugee' / *panahguzeen* label does not apply to Muhajirs, since they are in Pakistan as its 'makers' and not to take refuge. Muhajir translates as immigrant. They had left their former homeland 'forever', not just temporarily, as in the case of other refugees, such as the Afghans. Also, they are a distinct people whose thousand years history, language, and culture are different from that of the other ethnic-nationalities, namely the Punjabis, the Sindhis, Pathans and Baloch.

According to the MQM, the denial of Muhajir nationhood flows from a hegemonic establishment aiming against their representing their grievances before "The International Community as a distinct ethnic entity of the country or as a Nation within the Federation of Pakistan". The MQM emphasises that Muhajirs hailed from the Muslim minority provinces of undivided India, and had struggled for the promised land because they felt threatened by the majority Hindus, and that their foundational role in forging the nation cannot be deleted from history. Pakistan was created for all the Muslims of undivided India and not just for the Muslims of the present Pakistan, and former East Pakistan.

The dread of being homeless is unmistakable. In 1994 Altaf Hussain asked his constituency to seriously consider if they too would one day end up in camps akin to the ones in Bangladesh. After all, he argued, if the Stranded Pakistanis had been Baloch, Sindhi, Punjabi or Pathan would they have languished so endlessly? Evidently, the Muslims who appear to be closer to the heart of Pakistan were those from Somalia, Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Bosnia and the Kashmiris, Palestinians and Afghans. In July 1997 the MQM changed its name to Muttahida Qaumi Movement in an attempt to reach out to other Pakistanis. In September 2000 it shared a London platform with Baluch, Pashtoon and Sindhi leaders who have formed the Pakistan

Oppressed Nations Movement. It now proposes rebuilding a new Pakistan on the basis of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, wherein all the smaller nations like the Sindhis, Baloch, Seraikis and others will have rights and will resist the military.

For a year, Altaf Hussain has been repeating that the division of the subcontinent on the basis of religion was the biggest blunder in history. The two-nation theory, he states, has been trivialised over and over again: when the borders were closed to Indian Muslims in the 1950s, when Pakistan was split in 1971, and when the 'Stranded Pakistanis' landed up in refugee camps, and again in 1992, when the MQM faced a military crackdown. Not only was the subcontinent divided, but the Muslims of the subcontinent are still torn between two nations.

In his summing up, the two-nation theory was intended to deceive the Muslims of the subcontinent. Pakistan became the homeland for the Muslims of the majority provinces alone and not of the Muslims of the minority provinces who were rendered destitute by it. If the Muslims of India were to remain with a Hindu majority, why were they taught the two-nation theory at all, he asks. He also points out that there is much significance in the people of Bangladesh undoing their blunder of having subscribed to the two-nation theory.

Regarding the equation between Sindhis and Muhajirs there has been constant flip-flop on the part of the MQM. Another Bangladesh is often threatened. In the mid-1990s muhajir audiences had been known to chant, "*Sindh mein hoga kaise guzara ? Adha hamara adha tumhara*" (How can we co-exist in Sindh? Half is ours, half yours). But the MQM opposes a separate Sindhudesh and supports full provincial autonomy for Sindh within the framework of Pakistan (August 1999). Also the MQM states:

We do not want the division of Sindh province. We neither wish to create another province nor do we want to create a Jinnahpur. We do not want to become the Masters of Sindh...We would learn the Sindhi language (September 2000).

Most recently Altaf Hussain has slipped back to the position that persistent brutal acts of inflicting torture against many ethno-linguistic minorities will ultimately force the victims to think about a right to self determination, rather than demanding their rights in the framework of a federation (July 2001).

V

A major trope of the MQM is that the Punjabi establishment has over the years crafted a deep rift and hatred between the Sindhis and Muhajirs and disrupted all efforts at unity between the two. In his January 2000 appeal to Sindhis, Altaf Hussain repeated that Muhajirs do not remit their money beyond the boundaries of the province; they bury their dead there.

“They sink and swim together with their Sindhi brethren. It is now their Homeland....It is most unfortunate that even today the so-called Sindhi leaders talk of the rights of Sindhis but hurl abuses against Mohajirs”

and threaten to dump them into the Arabian Sea. He pronounces himself a son of ‘Sindh Dharti’ and suggests that the Sindhis join the Muhajirs in salvaging the land of the Sufi Shah Latif from the hegemony of the Punjabis.

Soon after, the chairman of the World Sindhi Congress, Dr. Safdar Sarki noted in February 2000 that this was a positive sign, for Altaf Hussain had for the first time:

explicitly and resolutely expressed his views on the injustice and wickedness inflicted upon Sindh and Sindhis after the creation of Pakistan

by the Punjabis. He added that the Sindhis had never trampled the rights of the Urdu-speaking population, nor had they shut their doors to the new settlers in 1947. G.M. Syed [who spent the better part of his life in prison for his secession politics], had after all seen in the MQM the lower and middle class Muhajirs making a leadership debut before they were turned against the Sindhis by ‘Punjabi agents’. That had been ‘the biggest mistake of the MQM in its history’. Muhajirs should start calling themselves Sindhis.

Indigenous Sindhis constitute no more than two per cent of the armed forces and a mere five per cent of the federal service and control 500 out of some 2,000 industrial units in the provinces. Prolonged political denial and economic deprivation explains why the Sindhis range themselves against the military-bureaucratic state structure’s exclusionary policies.²⁹ Ever since the 1983 Sindhi uprising for the restoration of democracy, the Muhajirs realised that they must come to terms with Sindhi aspirations if they wished to co-exist with them. “We don’t want to become Biharis” was a popular slogan, reflecting

an anxiety about being persecuted for having lived in hostility with the host population.³⁰

Though the demand for the repatriation of the 'Stranded Pakistanis' from Bangladesh remains unresolved, it has figured in the charter of peace that the MQM signed with the PPP in 1988, its accord with the IJI in 1989 and the PML in 1997. On their part the PPP, Sindhi Ittehad, the Sindhi Democrats Group and the World Sindhi Conference have stiffly opposed the repatriation project, and described the 'Stranded Pakistanis' as Biharis or at best Bangladeshi 'Biharis' who have no claims to a 'homeland' in the post-1971 Pakistan. For, no matter where they are settled in Pakistan, "Biharis" gravitate to Sindh and thus will ultimately turn Sindhis into *gair-mulkis* (aliens) in their own land.

Since around October 2000 Altaf Hussain has directed the MQM's reconstruction of Muhajir histories in the '80s and '90s to update them on the career of the two-nation theory and to enlist their intervention against the 'victimisation and discrimination' of Muhajirs. By contrast the Muhajirs in the *mashriq* (the former East Pakistan) had contacted relatives in Bihar in the aftermath of the making of Bangladesh. In many cases they temporarily moved to Bihar before navigating themselves to Pakistan. Those still in the camps in Bangladesh are beginning to come to terms with the loss of the aspired homeland of the 1940s. The complexities of the regional formations in Pakistan and the implications of the "lack of congruence between identity and territory",³¹ have prevented them from gaining it.

In numerous fora, subcontinental or diasporic, in print or on the web, the *hijrat* of 1947 continues to set off passionate debates about the fate of Muslims from the pre-1947 provinces, where they had been enumerated as a minority. To retrieve the layers of shared sub-continental lives and histories, academics and laymen alike continue to debate about the politics of the times, the migrant choices made, the equations between the sub-continent's regionally-based Muslims forming majorities and minorities, and about homelands and citizenship.

Notes:

1. The term Muhajir was used originally for those followers of the Prophet who migrated from Mecca to Medina to avoid religious persecution. In the context of Partition, the term describes migrants/refugees who moved to Pakistan from India to protect their religion and safeguard their interests as Muslims.
2. Badiuzaman, "The Last Wish", in *India Partitioned*, vol.i, pp. 138-9.
3. Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1997, p.162.
4. Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, pp.44-5.
5. "Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia", in Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997, p. 89.
6. Papiya Ghosh, "Reinvoking the Pakistan of the 1940s: Bihar's 'Stranded Pakistanis' ", *Studies In Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. ii, no. 1, 1995, p.133 and "Partition's Biharis" in Mushirul Hasan ed., *Islam, Communities and the Nation*, Manohar, New Delhi, 1998, p. 239; Sarah Ansari, "Partition, Migration and Refugees: Responses To The Arrival of Muhajirs in Sind During 1947-48", in D.A.Low and Howard Brasted, eds., *Freedom, Trauma, Continuities: Northern India and Independence*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1998, p. 101.
7. Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.235-7.
8. Papiya Ghosh, "Partition and the South Asian Diaspora", forthcoming.
9. Talbot, p. 109.
10. Ben Whitaker, *The Biharis in Bangladesh*, Minority Rights Group, London, 1972, p.7.
11. Sarah Ansari, p. 91; Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1998, p.109 mentions that three-fourths of all the Muhajirs, adding up to 4.7 million were Punjabis and they rapidly abandoned the Muhajir label because for them *hijrat* did not imply a linguistic or cultural change. Nor did it for the Khojas or Memons as Karachi used to be part of the Bombay Presidency in the past.
12. Syed Hussain Imam, *The Sad Plight of the Biharies From 1971 to 1983: An Appeal to the President of Pakistan and all the heads of the Muslim States of the Islamic World*, Mohammad Anisur Rahman, Karachi, 1983 reprint, p. 4.
13. Alok Bhalla, ed., *Stories About The Partition of India*, Indus, New Delhi, 1994, vol.ii, pp.141-52.
14. Indus, New Delhi: 1995, translated by Frances Pritchett, chapter 9.
15. The duping refers to the failure of the leaders of the Pakistan movement to adequately brief the Muslims of the Muslim minority provinces about the displacement implications of their movement.
16. "Renegotiating the Partition: Situating North American South Asians", Triangle South Asia Consortium, North Carolina State University, 28 April 1997; "Muhajir Migrants: Diasporic Mediations", Triangle South Asia Rockefeller Foundation Workshop III on 'Migrations, Real and Imagined: Constructing South Asian Muslim Identities', North Carolina State University, 23 May 1997; "Partition and the South Asian Diaspora", 21 April 2000, International Conference on Forced Migration in South Asian Region: *Displacement, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution*, Centre for Refugee Studies, Jadavpur University in collaboration with Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Law Research Institute, Kolkata & International Law Association , Kolkata Centre.

17. See Ranabir Samaddar, *The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration From Bangladesh to West Bengal*, Sage Publications, New Delhi 1999, pp. 60-2.
18. Mushirul Hasan, "Introduction" in Mushirul Hasan ed., *India Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom*, Lotus Collection, New Delhi, Roli Books, 1995, vol.i, p.31.
19. Suvir Kaul, "Introduction" in Suvir Kaul ed., *The Partitions of Memory: The After-life of the Division of India*, Permanent Black, New Delhi 2001, p. 10.
20. Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, "The 'Bihari' Minorities in Bangladesh: Victims of Nationalisms" in *Islam, Communities and the Nation*.
21. *The Pioneer*, 7 March 1994.
22. What follows is based on my papers mentioned in endnotes 6, 8 and 16 and "Partition's South Asians: Diasporic Mediations" written for the 14th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Williamsburg, 30 July, 1998.
23. Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp.194-7. Jalal adds that the struggle between Punjabis and Muhajirs over the spoils of the political economy and the state may well be the structurally more significant conflict than the Sindhi-Muhajir dimension.
24. See Stanley Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1966, pp. 166-7.
25. Estelle Dryland, "Migration and Resettlement: The Emergence of the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz" *South Asia*, vol. xxiii, no. 2, 2000, p. 141
26. Oskar Verkaaik, *A People of Migrants: Ethnicity, State and Religion in Karachi*, V.U. University Press, Amsterdam, 1994, 31 and 73-4.
27. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p. 152.
28. See endnote 22.
29. Ayesha Jalal, op. cit. pp. 195 and 197.
30. Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Separatism", *South Asia Bulletin*, vol. 8, 1988, p. 41.
31. Ayesha Jalal, op. cit. p. 257